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Abstract
We report the results of two experiments on the social acceptability of random devices
in allocation mechanisms. A majority of subjects do not opt for a lottery if they can ra-
tionalize an alternative mechanism as non-random. It is, however, possible to design a
payoff-equivalent mechanism to the lottery that is more acceptable. Our results shed light
on the real-world reliance on obscure criteria in allocation problems where lotteries seem to
be simpler and more efficient.
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1 Introduction
Consider an allocation problem in which a subject can either receive a high or a low reward.
This problem can be solved either with a lottery or with a set of criteria. If the two methods
offer the same odds of getting the high reward, will the subject prefer one over the other? In
this paper, we report the results of two experiments revealing a preference for the use of criteria.
The preference is not explained by overconfidence but seems to originate from an aversion to the
explicit use of a lottery. Reframing the lottery by allowing subjects to take a payoff-irrelevant
decision makes it more acceptable.
Many of the solutions provided by economists to real-world allocation problems involve a role
for randomization, usually as a tie-breaking rule. A leading example is the school allocation
mechanisms, such as the deferred acceptance algorithm.1 In practice, however, allocations
problems solved using explicit lotteries are rare (we discuss some of them in Appendix A). For
instance, in USA law, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) forbids an agency to take any
action that is “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion” (Vermeule, 2015, p.475). It
means that even in the absence of any information or rational reason to pick one decision over
the other, a federal agency is compelled to provide a rationalization and can never toss a coin.2
Anecdotal evidence from the implementation of school choice mechanisms in several countries
∗Lancaster University Management School, e.bouacida@lancaster.ac.uk
†Lancaster University Management School, r.foucart@lancaster.ac.uk
1Debates on the use of randomization in school choice revolve on its impact on parents’ strategies (Erdil and
Ergin, 2008; Kesten and Ünver, 2015; Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2019), but not on the acceptability of randomization
in itself.
2What lawmakers find objectionable is not the fact that an agency has the same probability of reaching one
decision or the other, but the failure to deliberate that the use of a randomization device represents (Leib and
Galoob, 2016, p.1860). In a case of custody allocation, the supreme court of Virginia stated that “A judge’s
act of tossing a coin in a courtroom to decide a legal issue pending before the court suggests that courts do not
decide cases on their merits but instead subject litigants to games of chance in serious matters without regard
to the evidence or applicable law.” (Supreme Court of Virginia, Record No. 071014).
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also shows a reluctance of parents to accept lotteries and a preference for “objective” albeit
often arbitrary and murky criteria.3
Another example is the award of research funding by peer review. Except for the very best
and worst submissions, this procedure is largely unpredictable (Cole et al., 1981; Graves et al.,
2011; Pier et al., 2018). Given the high cost spent writing and evaluating proposals, it would
be more cost-efficient to allocate funding randomly among applications deemed good enough,
perhaps with a subset of outstanding proposals guaranteed funding (Greenberg, 1998; Brezis,
2007; Fang and Casadevall, 2016; Roumbanis, 2019; Avin, 2019). However, in practice, scientists
and funding bodies have resisted this approach, insisting on providing a rationalization (Barnett,
2016).4
We ran two incentivized experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT hereafter) to
study whether there exists an individual revealed preference for the use of criteria over lotteries.
Subjects were paid a show-up fee to participate and earned an additional reward based on the
result of a game. A necessary step to be able to identify a potential preference was to identify
a set of criteria for which we could provide exact probabilities of winning before subjects chose
between it and a lottery. In both experiments, we asked subjects to give a sequence of 5
strategies of rock-paper-scissors (RPS) at the beginning. The choice of RPS strategies could
not be modified further. It became a set of criteria for which the odds of winning against a
given set of strategies could be computed. We then asked subjects to choose the process that
determined if they won the reward. The first possibility was to use their chosen strategies
against a player drawn from a data set of 2,500 real-world RPS players. They won the reward
if they won more RPS games than their randomly drawn opponent. In case of ties, the first
who won a round won the game.5
In experiment 1, the second possibility was to condition the reward on the toss of a fair
coin by an algorithm (CT hereafter). We chose this device as the simplest and most familiar
lottery, thereby more likely to be perceived as fair (Eliaz and Rubinstein, 2014). We find
that, on average, 66% of the subjects chose the RPS over the CT. When we provided subjects
their odds of winning RPS given their chosen strategies, some reacted to this information.
On average, our regression analysis estimates that out of 100 subjects, 25 switch mechanism
depending on whether or not their RPS strategies have a probability of winning higher than
1/2. Subjects knowing their odds of winning RPS were on average as likely to choose the coin
toss that those who did not know it, showing that the preference for RPS is not explained by
overconfidence. Moreover, subjects reacted similarly to the actual odds of winning and to their
perceived probability of winning when deciding under uncertainty.
In experiment 2, on top of 5 RPS strategies, we asked subjects to provide 5 strategies of a
repeated matching pennies (MP) game. The MP strategies would be played against a computer
choosing head and tails with equal probability. We then offered subjects the same choice as in
3In France, the system of allocation of students to universities (APB) used lotteries to break ties when capacity
was reached. It was criticized and is now replaced with another mechanism with a lot more criteria, reducing the
likelihood of ties and ending the use of lotteries. Importantly, the weights between the criterion are not public and
leave a lot of almost arbitrary leeway to the universities, which was not the case previously. In French-speaking
Belgium, a 2009 attempt to randomly allocate students in oversubscribed high schools lasted only a year after
being dubbed by some parents and the media the “lottery law” and replaced by a set of criteria still in use today.
In the UK, when a lottery was implemented for school allocation in Brighton and Hove, the Conservative party
(then in the opposition) pledged a country-wide ban of lotteries. On March 2008, before becoming Secretary of
State for Education, Michael Gove justified this stance on the BBC as “Would you like the fate of your children
to be decided by the spin of the roulette wheel or the roll of the dice? No, and neither would I. I think that one
of the key problems with lotteries is that they reduce almost one of the most important decisions that any parent
is going to make for their child, into a matter of chance.” While the ban was never implemented, lotteries have
not been extended either.
4The Health Research Council of New Zealand is a notable exception, running a pilot random allocation for
its early career “Explorer” grants since 2013.
5And if there was still a tie, in the end, the player won if she had spent an even number of seconds choosing
the RPS strategies.
2
experiment 1 but using MP instead of CT as an alternative to RPS. MP and CT are in practice
equivalent. MP’s odds are not influenced by a subject’s choice of strategies. We find, however,
that only 42% of our subjects chose the RPS in this setting, a proportion significantly different
from experiment 1. Re-framing the lottery as the result of a choice, even when the expected
payoff is the same, seems to make it much more socially acceptable. This result also suggests
that the preference for RPS in experiment 1 is not based on that game being factually more
“meritocratic”, as the probability of winning the MP is independent of the chosen strategies.
It also rules out the “competence hypothesis” of Heath and Tversky (1991) as an explanation.
There is no reason subjects would feel relatively more competent in experiment 2 with MP than
they are with CT in experiment 1.
The novelty of our approach is to provide an incentivized choice between a lottery and a set of
criteria. Survey evidence shows that people are reluctant to rely on the use of a random device
to determine the outcome of important hypothetical decisions involving other people (Keren
and Teigen, 2010). Oberholzer-Gee et al. (1997) also report survey evidence that a market
mechanism is the only procedure deemed less acceptable than a lottery for the allocation of a
nuclear waste facility.
Our results relate to several strands in the literature. It is well-known that individuals have
an “outcome bias” and a tendency to interpret success by merit and effort and ignore the role
of luck (Frank, 2016; Brownback and Kuhn, 2019). Hence, subjects may be willing to interpret
any device that is not explicitly a lottery as more meritocratic, even if it is completely random.
Once a reward has been received for reasons perceived as more meritocratic, it is then valued
more (Loewenstein and Issacharoff, 1994). This point is also related to the literature on “source
uncertainty”: Individuals treat uncertainty differently depending on the mechanism generating
it (see, for instance, Heath and Tversky (1991); Fox and Tversky (1995)). Finally, there is an
intrinsic value in holding decision rights (Bartling et al., 2014; Bobadilla-Suarez et al., 2017).
It is consistent with our subjects interpreting the use of their RPS strategies as something they
have “decided”, and may explain why the MP in experiment 2 is more acceptable than CT in
experiment 1.
Our result of an apparent aversion to being the subject of a lottery in an allocation prob-
lem contrasts with the way people behave when choosing between different options (see also
Appendix A). Indeed, individuals often choose to rely on a randomization device to make their
choice when indifferent or indecisive between two alternatives (Agranov and Ortoleva, 2017; Qiu
and Ong, 2017; Bouacida, 2019; Cettolin and Riedl, 2019). This “preference for randomization”
has been observed on subjects choosing strategies in allocation mechanisms such as school choice
(Dwenger et al., 2018), in which many subjects seem however reluctant for the mechanism itself
to use lotteries.
In the next section, we detail the experimental protocol. We provide the results in Section
3 and discuss them in Section 4.
2 Experiment
We ran two experiments whose aim are to choose a mechanism for allocating a reward to
yourself. The two mechanisms are a lottery with known probability and a set of criteria. The
set of criteria is stylized to the choice of five actions of a repeated rock, paper, scissors game.
The actions are then played against one player from a database of 2,500 we have compiled
(the database is briefly described in Section 2.3). We draw the opponent with an equiprobable
distribution. The subject should win more rounds than their opponent to win the RPS game.
In case of a tie, the first round which is not a tie is used to determine the winner. If they have
chosen the same five actions in the same order, then the subject wins if they spent an even
number of seconds on the choice screen.
The lottery in experiment 1 is a coin toss. In experiment 2, the lottery consists of five choices
3
of head and tail for a repeated matching penny game. The subject wins the MP whenever they
match three or more head and tails drawn by the computer. The computer draws head or tail
with equal probability. In both cases, the ex ante chances of winning the lottery are 50% and
are independent of the chosen strategies.
The experiments were run on Amazon Mechanical Turk on April 29, 2020 (experiment 1)
and May 13-14, 2020 (experiment 2), using oTree (Chen et al., 2016). A total of 197 subjects
finished experiment 1 and 89 experiment 2. The reward was $1.40 in experiment 1 and $0.40
in experiment 2. The show-up fee was $0.70 in experiment 1 and $0.40 in experiment 2. The
median time spent in the experiments was 3 minutes. The median hourly wage was $25.71 in
experiment 1 and $12.20 in experiment 2. The majority of our subjects declare themselves to be
male (68.5% and 53.8%, respectively). They are mostly between 25 and 40 years old, employed
and come from the United States. The two samples are similar to each other (see Appendix G
for a more detailed discussion).
In both experiments, we elicit the subjects’ beliefs have about their probability of winning
in the RPS and the MP when these probabilities were not given. In both experiments, the belief
elicitation procedure is incentivized. In experiment 1, it is done by asking the number of time
they expect to win against our dataset (following Schlag and Tremewan, 2020). In experiment
2, we ask them the score they expect to reach in both RPS and MP (both scores are between
-5 and 5 and are thus comparable). They are paid if their belief on their score is close enough
from the real score.6 The two belief elicitation methods are not equivalent, as the score in RPS
does not exactly translate into a probability of winning.7
2.1 Timing
The experiments are divided into:
1. Description of the experiment;
2. Description of the RPS and MP games and choices of the five actions in each (only in
experiment 2 for MP);
3. Choice of the allocation mechanism;
4. Incentivized belief elicitation, when appropriate, and asking subjects for their reason of
choosing one mechanism over the other;
5. Demographic questions;
6. Incentivized ambiguity attitude elicitation (in experiment 1 only);
7. Feedback on their choices and payment.
2.2 Treatments
We have four different treatments. We call the first two treatments knowledge and ignorance.
In the knowledge treatment, we tell the subjects their average probability of winning the RPS
game before choosing the mechanism. That is, we tell them the percentage of RPS games of
the database they win against. In the ignorance treatment, they receive no information about
the probability of winning of their five RPS actions. We did not elicit their beliefs about the
probability of winning the RPS in the knowledge treatment.
6The only correct belief in experiment 2 for MP is 0. In experiment 1, subjects beliefs were considered correct
if they were at within 1/2500 of the correct belief. In experiment 2, if they were within 0.1 score of their real
score.
7This is because of the tie-breaking rules.
4
We call the other two treatments chance and ability. The two treatments are two different
framings of the RPS game. In the chance treatment, we tell the subjects that RPS is a game
of chance, whereas, in the ability treatment, we tell them it is a game of ability and strategy.
The exact framing is available in Appendix B. We are not deceiving the subjects. The two
descriptions are accurate depictions of the game. Competitions of RPS exist and some players
fare on average better, mainly by exploiting the biases of others (we describe the data sets
in Appendix C). It is also a game of chance, as the Nash equilibrium strategy of this game
is to play each action with probability one third. Playing Nash guarantees to win with 50%
probability.
We have used a 2x2 factorial design for experiment 1 to assign the different treatments. The
repartition of subjects in the different treatments is shown in Table 1. In experiment 2, subjects
were primed to see the RPS as a game of chance and did not know their probability of winning.
So experiment 2 was run using only ignorance and chance treatments.





We have collected the 2,500 strategies of the opponent in the RPS game from actual games
played on the website https://roshambo.me.8 An overview of the data set is available in Table
8 in Appendix C, as well as a comparison with the observed choices in our two experiments.
One of the well-known biases in RPS is that more than a third of players choose Rock as the
first action, and less than a third choose scissors, which mean that playing Paper is the best
first move. The average probability of winning against our dataset is always between 44.80%
and 55.00%. In that sense, the set of criteria is closed from the lottery ex ante. The subjects
do not know that. The only information about their chances of winning in the RPS game –
in the Knowledge treatment – is the probability of winning against our dataset. Moreover,
no strategy gives an exact probability of winning of 50%. As a consequence, a player valuing
expected monetary payoff only should never be indifferent in the knowledge treatment.
3 Results
Most subjects choose the RPS in experiment 1 (66% overall treatments), whereas most of them
choose the MP in experiment 2 (58%). The proportion of subjects choosing the RPS is signif-
icantly higher in experiment 1.9 The proportion of subjects choosing the RPS is significantly
different from 50% in experiment 1 but not in experiment 2.10 In the next subsections, we
explore possible explanations for these differences.
3.1 Effect of the Treatments
Table 2 shows that the different treatments do not seem to influence the choice of the allocation
mechanism. What this similarity implies is that the observed preference for RPS cannot be
8We thank Lasse Hassing for giving us access to their data.
9The p-value of the Fisher exact test is < 0.001 between the two experiments. When restricting the sample
of experiment 1 to the same treatments as experiment 2, the p-value is 0.023.
10The p-values of the one-sample two-sided t-test are < 0.001 and 0.14, respectively.
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explained by overconfidence. Overall, subjects in the Knowledge treatment are equally likely
to choose it than those in the Ignorance treatment. There is, however, a role for ambiguity
aversion. We find that – as expected – ambiguity averse subjects are less likely to choose RPS
than the others (see Appendix F for more detailed results).
Table 2: Proportion of subjects choosing each mechanism, depending on the treatment.
Ability Chance Overall
Knowledge 64% 71% 67%
Ignorance 66% 65% 66%
Overall 65% 68% 66%
Note: the proportions are not significantly
different between the different treatment
cells (using a Fisher exact test).
Using this level of aggregation to understand choices is not sufficient. In expected monetary
payoffs, the lottery is more valuable if the probability of winning the RPS is below 50%, and
less valuable otherwise. When we introduce the 50% probability of winning the RPS threshold,
it matters in the Knowledge treatment. In the Ignorance treatment, however, what should
influence the subjects’ choice is their belief that they are above or below 50%. Table 3 shows
that it is indeed the case. When subjects know their probability of winning the 50% threshold
makes a significant difference. It is also true when they believe it is the case. The real probability,
however, does not matter when they do not know it. We illustrate this phenomenon graphically
in Appendix D.
Table 3: Effect of knowing or believing that the chances of winning the RPS are above or
below 50% in experiment 1.
q < 0.5 q > 0.5 P-value1
Knowledge 58% 82% 0.020
Ignorance & Really better2 63% 70% 0.59
Ignorance & Believed better3 55% 80% 0.014
1 P-value of the Fisher exact test;
2 Really better means that the real probability of winning the
RPS is above 50%;
3 Believed better means that subjects believe their probability
of winning the RPS is above 50%.
To summarize, a first variable that seems to matter to understand the aggregate choices
in experiment 1 is whether they believe or know that their probability of winning the RPS is
higher or lower than 50%. However, it matters only for a fraction of subjects, as 58% of them
choose the RPS even when they know they have a lower probability of winning it, and 18% of
them choose the CT when they have a higher probability of winning the RPS.
3.1.1 Regression Analysis
Table 4 report the result of a regression analysis that confirms the previous results.11The variable
RPS ⪰ CT is a dummy that takes value 1 when subjects know or believe that their chance of
11We provide additional specifications in Appendix E. Table 9 justifies that we do not look at all interaction
terms.
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winning in the RPS is above 50%. Out of 100 subjects, an average of 25 choose RPS instead of
CT when their probability of winning the RPS is above the threshold of 1/2. While it clearly
shows that the probability of winning matters, it also implies that a majority of the subjects are
not deciding only on their expected monetary payoff. As a rough breakdown, the estimation
tells us that around 55% of the subjects would choose RPS even if it gives odds lower than
1/2, around 25% pick the device that gives them the highest probability of winning, and 20%
choose CT even if the RPS has better odds. Note that the estimation only looks at the exact
50% threshold. Table 10 in Appendix E looks at the influence of the distance with the 50%
threshold, instead of a dummy. The explanatory power is similar, but we cannot assume that
the interaction terms do not matter.12
Table 4: Regression on the probability of choosing the RPS mechanism.
Full Sample Knowledge Ignorance
Mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Intercept) 0.564 0.539 0.581 0.626 0.545 0.538
(0.046) (0.081) (0.063) (0.074) (0.068) (0.089)
RPS ⪰ CT 0.248**** 0.258**** 0.240*** 0.256*** 0.259*** 0.260***
(0.064) (0.063) (0.089) (0.087) (0.092) (0.093)
Knowledge 0.086
(0.095)
Ability 0.012 -0.103 0.013
(0.096) (0.090) (0.096)
Knowledge & Ability -0.116
(0.132)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
N 197 197 101 101 96 96
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.055 0.053 0.055 0.063 0.053
(* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001)
We observe a similar phenomenon in experiment 2. Figure 1 shows a wide range of incorrect
beliefs. In particular, only 4.5% of the subjects report the only correct belief of a 1/2 probability
of winning in the MP (the horizontal line at MP Belief = 0). Regarding the choices made, it is
clear that the decision of a large number of subjects is not only based on their beliefs on the
expected monetary payoff of the two mechanisms. If it were the case, the choices of allocation
mechanisms would be cleanly divided between the top-left and bottom-right by the red line.
The beliefs may have some influence on the choices made by subjects, as shown in Table 5.
Simply being above or below the red line does not significantly influence the choice made, but
being further away from this line may, as shown by the first regression. The explanatory power
of these regressions is very small, however. It suggests that beliefs are not the main reason why
subjects chose one mechanism over the other in experiment 2.
3.1.2 Discussion
RPS is significantly preferred to MP as an allocation mechanism in experiment 1, but not in
experiment 2. We have shown above that some subjects mainly base their decision on their
probability of winning, in particular in experiment 1. For other subjects however, it is not

















Figure 1: Beliefs and chosen allocation mechanism in Experiment 2.





Beliefs (RPS −MP ) 0.058*
(0.035)




Adjusted R2 0.010 -0.009
(* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, ****
p<0.001)
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Table 6: Classification of the comments.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 p-value1
Preference 36% 36% 0.69
Probability 48% 44% 1.0
Sample 153 (out of 197) 72 (out of 89)
1 P-value of the Fisher Exact Test.
the case: a majority of subjects knowing that their probability of winning in experiment 1
is lower than 1/2 still choose the RPS. Experiment 2 gives us a tentative explanation of the
reasons behind this revealed preference: some people do not like to be the subject of an explicit
lottery when an alternative allocation mechanism based on criteria is available. It is possible,
however, to transform an explicit lottery by giving subject payoff-irrelevant decisions to make,
as in experiment 2. In that case, the aggregate preference for RPS of experiment 1 disappears.
In addition to the strategies and choice of mechanism in experiment 1 and 2, we have
asked some demographic questions. These characteristics do not have an impact on the choice
of mechanism. In contrast to other situations involving risk and uncertainty (Charness and
Gneezy, 2012), gender, in particular, does not play a significant role in our setup (see Appendix
G.2).
3.2 Stated Preferences
We have also asked people why they chose each alternative. We have categorized their answers
into two groups. The first group is composed of subjects stating that they prefer one mechanism
over the other, for various reasons, and that it influenced their choices. The second is composed
of subjects stating that their choice was driven by their probability of winning. Not all comments
can be neatly divided into these two categories, and some belong to both. Table 6 summarizes
how many subjects are classified as having their preference or the probability of winning driving
their choice. The comments that could not be cleanly interpreted as belonging to one or the
other category are left out of this analysis. The proportion of people claiming to be influenced
by probabilities or preference for one mechanism over the other are strikingly similar in the
two experiments (and not significantly different). Importantly for our purpose, not all subjects
report being influenced by the probability, and a significant proportion of subjects express a
taste for one mechanism or another. Among the 24 subjects for which we can tease out what
mechanism they prefer in experiment 1, 88% prefer the RPS. Among the 15 subjects for which
we can tease out what mechanism they prefer in experiment 2, 53% prefer the RPS. The size
of the samples do not allow us to draw firm conclusions, but all the evidence we have gathered
point in the same direction.
Table 7 shows that subjects acted on their stated preferences. When subjects stated that
their probability of winning was driving their choices, they chose more often the RPS when
they believed or knew that it was better, and the difference is significant. When they report
a preference that is not based on the probability of winning, they chose RPS much more. It
shows that many people intrinsically prefer the RPS to MP as an allocation mechanism in
experiment 1. We also see that this difference is not significant at the 10% level for those
players who believe/know that their probability of winning RPS is higher than 1/2. In that
case, the intrinsic preference for RPS and the higher probability of winning indeed go in the
same direction. We see a similar pattern in experiment 2, but at a lower level. We further
explore the stated preferences in Appendix E. Subjects who did not state that the probability
of winning was the main factor influencing their choice chose the RPS more often than those
who said so.
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Table 7: Proportion of the RPS choice.
(a) In Experiment 1
RPS ⪰MP No Yes p-value
Probability 30% 70% 0.001
Not Probability 70% 90% 0.076
p-value < 0.001 0.118
(b) In Experiment 2
RPS ⪰MP No Yes p-value
Probability 8% 38% 0.17
Not Probability 63% 62% 1.0
p-value 0.003 0.536
(P-value of the Fisher exact test)
4 Discussion
The main result of our experiments is that a majority of people (around 55% of our sample)
dislike their fate being the subject of an explicit lottery (a coin toss), and prefer to be subject to
a set of criteria (how well their choice of RPS strategies fare against a player drawn at random
from a database). Our interpretation is that those subjects want to be able to tell themselves
they are in control and do not want to attribute their possible success to luck. They are willing
to pay a premium for that. A minority of subjects (around 25%) seem to be only influenced
by the probability of winning. The rest (around 20%) prefer the explicit lottery over the set of
criteria. An interpretation can be that those subjects perceive RPS to be as random as a lottery
and prefer the simpler and perhaps more familiar coin toss (Eliaz and Rubinstein, 2014).
This majority preference for criteria disappears if the explicit lottery is re-framed to involve
payoff-irrelevant decisions. The willingness to interpret a set of criteria as being different from
a lottery is strong. It seems to extend to something as obviously random as the choice of
strategies in a repeated matching pennies game against a computer drawing head and tail with
equal probability. With the RPS and MP, it is possible to say that we deserve being in a good
position because we made the right choices. Explicit lotteries are harder to rationalize than
such “non-random” mechanisms.
There may be other motives than not liking randomness to choose RPS over CT in the
first experiment. First, subjects may want to know the results of their choices, to discover
how well they played in the RPS. However, the fact that the preference for RPS disappears in
experiment 2 is difficult to reconcile with this explanation, unless we take the view that people
are equally interested to know how well they “played” at guessing how head and tails are drawn
by a random device. It is, however, a point we would like to explore in the future, for instance,
by varying the level of effort players have to put into the criteria used by our mechanism.
Second, subjects may believe that it is harder for us to manipulate the result of their choices
in the RPS compared to the CT. Again, this explanation holds only if one argues that it is
also easier for us to manipulate a coin toss drawn by the computer (experiment 1) than five
coin tosses (experiment 2). The fear of manipulation is a valid criticism of our experiment: it
largely relates to our subjects trusting our algorithms, or at least not trusting one mechanism
more than the other. This weakness also extends to the kind of real-world mechanisms we aim
to inform with our experiment, typically designed and operated by government agencies. For
instance, according to a recent Gallup World Poll,13 31% of the UK citizens, 41% of the French
citizens and 59% of the US ones answer “no” to whether they believe elections in their country
are honest. We believe that the question of how transparent mechanisms can be made is thus
an important one, that we wish to explore by making the randomness based on the result of
something we visibly cannot control.
A final comment relates to the specificity of the subjects we drew from the AMT sample. It
is well-known that AMT subjects behave in a way that is consistent with a standard laboratory
13“Faith in Elections in Relatively Short Supply in U.S.,” RJ Reinhart, Gallup, February 13, 2020.
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setting (Horton et al., 2011), and allow studying behaviour in an arguably more externally valid
way as the panel is more diverse (see for instance Rand et al., 2012; Kuziemko et al., 2015).
We would, however, be interested to know if, for instance, the share of people displaying a
preference for criteria remains similar in a different setting.
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APPENDIX
A Lotteries in Allocation Problems
In this section, we provide a cursory review of the use of lotteries in real-world allocation
problems and the debates around it. In the first part, we discuss the idea of equipoise, the basic
ethical principle behind the use of randomization in medicine. We then show how a similar
idea is used to justify lotteries outside of the medical field. In the second part, we discuss the
difference between using lotteries to make a decision and being the subject of a lottery.
A.1 Equipoise and the Need Exhaust All Possible Criteria
In the medical literature, randomization is seen as ethical if a state of equipoise is reached: a
consensus that none of the possible outcomes of the lottery is ex ante better than the others
(Lilford and Jackson, 1995). For this reason, the medical profession often reports a difficulty
to recruit subjects for Randomized Control Trials (RCTs). One explanation is that it is very
difficult for a doctor not to seek an additional rationalization instead of declaring two possible
treatments to be ex ante equivalent (Donovan et al., 2014). In our context, the condition of
equipoise corresponds to the idea that there is no allocation problem, as all the options are
equivalent ex ante. Equipoise is, however, not always necessary. When resources are scarce – a
new medicine available in limited quantity, HIV in the developing world has been a prominent
example – randomization is an acceptable allocation mechanism. The difficulty is to make
people acknowledge that an allocation mechanism is necessary and that no criterion is fairer
than the use of a random device (Lilford and Jackson, 1995; Toroyan et al., 2000).
RCTs are also common in economics. Here, equipoise would be genuine uncertainty about
the relative benefits of different interventions (Petticrew et al., 2013). Most RCTs in economics,
however, use a random device to provide a treatment with expected positive effects to a sub-
group of the population. The rest of the population should not benefit, and even sometimes
suffer from the absence of treatments (Aldashev et al., 2017; Deaton and Cartwright, 2018;
Heckman, 2020). For this reason, RCTs are often criticized as being unethical. As in the med-
ical literature, proponents of RCTs defend the use of a random device as the fairest way to
allocate an intervention when resources are scarce (Singer et al., 2019).
What makes lotteries socially acceptable is thus the conviction that there is no better way to
decide. Public opposition to the use of random devices is often grounded on the case that other
criteria would be fairer, or even that no allocation mechanism is necessary.14 Similarly, most
lotteries used to solve real-world allocation problems are accepted because, first, the allocation
problem exists and that, second, there is no better rationalization for the decision. In the case
of the military draft for instance: “When a number of people fulfil all the requirements of,
or qualifications for, a particular position or duty, the notion of a lottery or random selection
allows each individual the same chance of attaining that position or being selected for that duty
(Fienberg, 1971).”15 Another prominent real-world use of lotteries for allocation purposes is the
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (Besley et al., 1993; Anderson and Baland, 2002).
ROSCAs are an informal financial institution in which a joint saving is regularly allocated at
14Justifying his opposition to lotteries in school allocation, future UK Secretary of State for Education Michael
Gove claims in a March 2008 BBC interview to be “Completely opposed to lotteries because lotteries aren’t a
way of solving this problem. With a lottery all you’re basically trying to do is come up with an ingenious scheme
to allocate a small number of good school places (...) [We] need to ensure that (...) parents get the sort of school
that they want for the children.” To the best of our knowledge, there is no high profile case against the use of a
random allocation procedure explicitly stating that the parties would have higher chances with an objective set
of criteria.
15Similarly, Lyndon Johnson justified the Vietnam draft as an “equal and uniform treatment for all men in
like circumstances” (our emphasis, Congressional Record of the US senate. March 6, 1967, p.5479.)
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random to one of the members. They are particularly prevalent in the developing world, pre-
cisely because its members acknowledge the scarcity of resources and the need for an allocation
mechanism.
A.2 Using Lotteries to Decide VS Being the Subject of a Lottery
As mentioned in the introduction, our result of an aversion to being the subject of a lottery
contrasts with the well-understood idea of “preference for randomization”: When indifferent,
individuals often choose to use a lottery to make their choice. These two very different effects
suggest that what makes a lottery socially acceptable can also be the extent to which those
choosing the allocation mechanism are at the same time the subjects of the mechanism.
Perhaps one of the most famous lotteries in the world is the “Green card lottery.” Since
1992, the US Diversity Immigrant Visa program awards permanent residency to around 50,000
people a year, combined with criteria based on the origin of the applicant and mild education
or employment requirements. It is, however, a widely criticized program, and its opponents –
among which the current US president – argue that it is unfair and there should be additional
criteria to distinguish between applicants.16 For the short-term skilled migration programs
H-1B, a random tie-breaking rule is used to choose applicants among those who qualify, but
the lottery part of the program is not widely advertised (Pathak et al., 2020). A common
characteristic of those two lotteries is that the participants are, by definition, not US citizens.
How they perceive their relative ability to perform under different procedures has, therefore, no
impact on the social acceptability of the random device by the US public.
Lotteries are also used in the allocation of affordable housing in several US cities. The use
of the randomization device is typically combined with an assessment of needs so that all the
perceived “fair” criteria have been exhausted. The simplest and most efficient randomization
device, a common lottery to determine priority for all items (Arnosti and Shi, 2020) is, however,
much less used than more complex individual lotteries combined with additional criteria. This
case is, again, one in which taxpayers decide the best way to allocate money among a small part
of the population. It is not a decision taken directly by those who could potentially benefit from
it, and how acceptable the lottery is for taxpayer matters at least as much as how acceptable it
is for the beneficiaries.
B Framing Treatments
This section summarizes the difference between the “ability” and the “chance” treatments. In
the description of the RPS game (stage 2 of the timing), we used the following formulations:
1. One as a child’s play of chance (Chance)
Rock-paper-scissors (RPS) is an old child play originating from ancient China.
[. . . ]
2. One as a game of ability and strategic thinking (Ability)
Rock-paper-scissors (RPS) is an old game of strategy originating from ancient
China. [. . . ] RPS is also a well-studied game in biology, psychology, and ar-
tificial intelligence. In international competitions, some players consistently
outperform the others. Computer scientists have produced algorithms able to
exploit the predictable behaviour of human players and win more often against
them.
16The US President Donald Trump declared in 2018 that he would “only sign an immigration deal that cancels
the diversity visa lottery program” as “under the diversity visa program, countries give us their worst people, they
put them in a bin” (all quotes from Rafael Bernal, “What is the diversity visa Lottery?”, The Hill, 01/28/18).
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Then, at the time of making the actual decision (stage 3 of the timing) we added the following
sentence in the Ability treatment:
Your probability of winning the RPS depends on how well your chosen actions
performed against past RPS players.
C Description of the RPS Database
Table 8 summarizes the strategies of the 2,500 players in the Roshambo sample and the subjects
in our experiments. The latter perform “worse” than the players in Roshambo, as shown by
their quite unbalanced choice between the three different actions, even more heavily biased
towards the choice of “rock.” It is also illustrated by the fact that the best pure strategy has
very high odds of winning in the two experiments compared to the Roshambo data set. This
result is reassuring in the sense that the bias in favour of “rock” is easy to find when looking
for the best strategies to win RPS on any Internet search engine. It seems this is not something
our subjects tried to do. We denote by Worst (resp. Best) profile the sequence of strategies
that give the lowest (resp. highest) probability of winning against a sample.
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of the strategies played in the different RPS games.
Roshambo Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Rock 34.56% 42.03% 44.49%
Paper 33.95% 36.65% 33.26%
Scissors 31.49% 21.32% 22.25%
Best Profile (P, S, P, P, P) (P, P, P, P, P) (P, P, S, P, P)
Probability Best 55.00% 79.19% 78.65%
Worst Profile (R, R, R, S, S) (R, R, S, R, S) (R, R, R, R, S)
Probability Worst 44.80% 24.37% 24.16%
D The 50% Threshold
Figure 2 plots the real probability of winning against the elicited beliefs in experiment 1 in
the ignorance treatment, as well as the allocation mechanism chosen. The figure shows that
subjects are not very good at predicting their probability of winning, otherwise, they would all
be on the red line. 42.7% of subjects believe that their probability of winning the RPS is higher
than 50%, but 66% of them choose the RPS. The beliefs are still correlated with choices. There



















Figure 2: Beliefs and decisions when the probability is unknown.
E Additional Regressions in Experiment 1
E.1 Interaction Terms
Table 9 shows the regression of Table 4 using all interactions terms. None of the additional
interaction terms is significant, which justifies the use of a shorter model in Section 3.1.1.
E.2 Using Distance in Beliefs
Table 10 is the exact counterpart of Table 4 but using the distance instead of a dummy for
the preference. We find that the results are robust to this modification. The magnitude of the
coefficient differs between the knowledge and ignorance treatment because the real difference in
probability is an order of magnitude smaller than the believed one (0.023 vs 0.28 in absolute
value). In short, the effect of beliefs is robust to how we specify them.
E.3 Adding Stated Preferences
Table 11 shows that stated preferences for the probability do matter. Subjects who care about
the probability choose less often the RPS, compared to the baseline. As we said earlier, knowing
the probability and having a probability of winning the RPS that is higher than 50% also drive
subjects to choose the RPS. This effect is mainly significant for subjects who mention that
probability drives their choices.
F Ambiguity Aversion
Table 12 presents the probability of choosing RPS in the first experiment depending on whether
or not subjects display ambiguity aversion.
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Table 9: Regression capturing the effect of believing or knowing that the probability of
winning the RPS is higher than the probability of winning the Coin Toss in experiment 1.
Full Sample Knowledge Ignorance
Mechanism
(Intercept) 0.545 0.600 0.545
(0.108) (0.084) (0.108)




Ability -0.000 -0.044 -0.000
(0.140) (0.129) (0.140)
RPS ⪰ CT & Knowledge 0.093
(0.178)
RPS ⪰ CT & Ability 0.029 -0.154 0.029
(0.189) (0.171) (0.189)
Knowledge & Ability -0.044
(0.190)
RPS ⪰ CT & Knowledge & Ability -0.183
(0.255)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS
N 197 101 96
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.052 0.043
(* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001)
Table 10: Regression capturing the effect of the distance between the (believed or real)
probability of winning the RPS and the Coin Toss in experiment 1, using a restricted
regression model.
Full Sample Knowledge Ignorance
Mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Intercept) 0.685 0.683 0.714 0.770 0.692 0.681
(0.033) (0.073) (0.044) (0.058) (0.047) (0.073)
RPS − CT 0.391*** 0.405*** 4.922*** 5.263*** 0.369** 0.372**
(0.148) (0.148) (1.706) (1.669) (0.148) (0.149)
Knowledge 0.028
(0.097)
Ability 0.021 -0.108 0.019
(0.097) (0.090) (0.097)
Knowledge & Ability -0.090
(0.135)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
N 197 197 101 101 96 96
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.017 0.059 0.063 0.047 0.037
(* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001)
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Table 11: Full model regression taking into account stated preferences. Probability is a











Probability & RPS ⪰ CT -0.255
(0.228)
Probability & Knowledge -0.088
(0.179)
RPS ⪰ CT & Knowledge -0.027
(0.212)





Note: Using the distance RPS −CT yield a similar table,
but has been omitted for brevity.
(* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001)
Table 12: Ambiguity Aversion on the Mechanism Chosen
Ambiguity Averse Not AA p-value1
Knowledge 61% 73% 0.29
Ignorance 57% 72% 0.18
Everyone 59% 72% 0.07
1 P-value of the Fisher exact test.
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As we would expect, ambiguity averse subjects choose more often the coin toss, which has
a known and immediate probability of winning.
To elicit ambiguity aversion, subjects made the following incentivized choice:
The two urns in the image above contain red and black balls. We will draw one ball
from one of these urns. The left urn contains 50 red and 50 black balls. The right
urn contains 100 red and black balls, but in a proportion entirely unknown to you.
You can choose the urn from which the ball is drawn and the colour to bet on. You
will earn $0.10 if you bet on the colour drawn (and $0.00 otherwise).
What urn do you choose?
What ball colour do you choose?
We classified as ambiguity averse the subjects choosing the left urn. It means that we may
be classifying as ambiguity averse subjects who are ambiguity neutral. So our elicitation of
ambiguity aversion is an upper bound of ambiguity averse subjects. The effect of ambiguity
aversion is therefore limited at best, as our little significant p-value shows.
G Demographics
G.1 Descriptive Statistics
We have asked subjects for 4 main demographic questions: gender, country of residence, em-
ployment status and age. The questions are self-reported and not incentivized. The majority
of our subjects comes from the United States (68.0% in experiment 1 and 73.0% in experiment
2). The second highest country of residence is India, which represents 24.9% and 15.7% of the
sample. The majority are employed (79.7% in experiment 1 and 77.5% in experiment 2). The
majority are between 25 and 40 years old (75.6% and 76.4%). The proportion of employed
residents of the USA between 25 and 40 years old represents 39.6% and 44.9% of the sample,
respectively. If we gather Indian and USA residents, the proportions become 58.8% and 55.1%.
The two samples are similar from a demographic standpoint. The difference in the choice of the
allocation mechanism is not because of a difference in the sample. The relative homogeneity of
the sample does not allow us to investigate the effect of demographic characteristics on choices.
The only demographic characteristic which is sufficiently heterogeneous to allow for an
investigation is gender, and we report it in the next Section.
G.2 Gender
Table 13 presents the probability of choosing RPS in the two experiments depending on the
self-reported gender of the participants. Only one subject picked the option not to do so, in the
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Table 13: Gender on the Mechanism Chosen
Male Female p-value1
Experiment 1 69% 61% 0.37
N 135 61
Experiment 2 47% 38% 0.54
N 47 42
1 p-value of the Fisher exact test.
first experiment. The subject is excluded from this analysis, There is no significant difference
between genders. If we add gender to the regression of Tables 4 or Table 5, the effect is not
significant.
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